Motions to Dismiss Still A Possibility

Mark Kingseed by Mark Kingseed

In spite of the recent Second District Appellate Court decision in Sacksteder v. Senny, 2012 Ohio 4452 (2012), which declined to adopt the more stringent pleading standards set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), it is still possible to get inadequately pled complaints dismissed via a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings.  Coolidge Wall recently succeeded in having an intentional infliction of emotional distress count dismissed in a discrimination suit because the plaintiff had not pled facts sufficient to demonstrate the requisite “extreme and outrageous” conduct exceeding “all possible bounds of decency.”  The court ruled that terminating an at-will employee, even if there were allegations of discrimination involved, did not automatically rise to the level of a viable intentional infliction of emotional distress case.  Rather, the court held that since the harm identified by the plaintiff “is limited to that produced by her discharge,” the plaintiff had alleged nothing that could provoke the level of outrage necessary to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

There is no doubt that successful motions for judgment on the pleadings or motions to dismiss are more difficult given the Sacksteder decision.  However, as the recent decision demonstrates an aggressive and carefully thought out Motion to Dismiss can still be successful.  A defendant’s counsel should carefully analyze the facts alleged to determine whether the allegations, if proven, meet the prima facie elements of the cause of action.  If not, a Motion to Dismiss is still a tool which can be used.

How to Increase the Odds That the Loser “Really Pays”

Richard A. Talda  by Richard A. Talda

Often, a client seeking our advice asks if they can recover their attorney’s fees in a lawsuit.  We explain that an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing party only occurs in a few situations:  when a Federal or State law mandates an attorney fee award to the lawsuit’s winner, or when a court, in its discretion, determines that the behavior of the losing party is so egregious that punitive damages and attorney’s fees should be awarded.  We explain that the necessary “egregious behavior” needs to almost rise to the level of criminal activity before a court will even consider a request for attorney’s fees.  While most clients believe that the wrongs done to them by adverse parties are always “criminal” in the sense of being intentional and outrageous, it is rare when a court will award attorney’s fees purely based on bad business behavior.

However, clients can dramatically improve their chances to recover their attorney’s fees by providing a loser pays requirement in their contracts, agreements, purchase orders, proposals, and even in their standard terms and conditions.  These clauses are generally enforceable in court and provide a means for a wronged person to recover attorney’s fees when pursuing the adverse party for damages and compensation.

Critical to enforcement of a loser pays provision is the need to make it part of your contract or agreement.  Therefore, care must be taken in the specific language of such clauses as well as how they are disclosed and agreed to by all of the parties in a business relationship to ensure enforceability.  This is particularly true, if a loser pays clause is found in your terms and conditions.  You should consult your legal advisor as to how best to impose and ensure enforceability of such provisions against other parties with whom you do business.

IRS Announces 2013 Pension Plan Limitations

 

On October 18, 2012, the IRS announced cost-of-living adjustments for 2013 retirement plan contributions.  Individuals will be able to contribute more to retirement plans in 2013.  Highlights of the IRS announcement include:

  • Increasing the salary deferral limit for 401(k) and 403(b) plans from $17,000 to $17,500.
  • Leaving unchanged the additional catch-up contribution for employees age 50 and older at $5,500.
  • Increasing the limit on total contributions to defined contribution plans from $50,000 to $51,000.
  • Leaving unchanged the definition of highly compensated employee as employees making $115,000 per year.
  • Increasing the amount of compensation that can be taken into consideration for retirement plan contributions from $250,000 to $255,000.
  • Increasing the contribution limit to individual retirement accounts (IRAs) from $5,000 to $5,500, but leaving unchanged the IRA catch-up contribution for those age 50 and older at $1,000.

The Social Security Administration earlier announced that the Social Security Wage Base for 2013 will increase to $113,700.

House Bill 48 Modified Ohio’s LLC Statute. Your company’s rights and obligations may have changed.

W. Chip Herin III  by W. Chip Herin III

Effective May 4, 2012, House Bill 48 significantly restructured Ohio’s LLC statute by codifying Members’ and Managers’ fiduciary duties, delineating the duties a Member-Manager owes depending on how that Member was appointed Manager, and adding statutory restrictions to Operating Agreements. Below is a summary of these changes.

  • Members Cannot Opt Out of Fiduciary Duties: Departing significantly from Delaware law, Ohio LLC Members can no longer eliminate or opt out of their fiduciary duties through the LLC’s Operating Agreement. However, Members are permitted to carve out certain exceptions from the duty of loyalty, including identifying specific transactions or acts that do not violate the duty of loyalty if not manifestly unreasonable. Further, Members or a number or percentage of Members specified in the Operating Agreement may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure of all material facts, a specific act or transaction that would otherwise violate the duty of loyalty. For example, Members may need to create an exception to the duty of loyalty when the Members’ other business activities may compete with the business of the LLC, as is often the case with LLCs formed to own real estate.
  • Member-Manager Fiduciary Duties: The new law provides that if a Member was appointed in writing and agrees in writing to be a Manager, then that Member owes the fiduciary duties of a Manager (presumably, in addition to the fiduciary duties of a Member): to act in good faith, in a manner the Manager reasonably believes to be in or not contrary to the best interests of the LLC, and with the care that an ordinary prudent person in a similar position would use under similar circumstances. Otherwise, a Manager who is also a Member of the LLC owes only the fiduciary duties of a Member, which are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care (as well as the obligation of good faith and fair dealing when discharging those duties).
  • Operating Agreements: Typically, the terms of an Operating Agreement supersede any contrary provisions in the Ohio LLC statute. However, under the new law, there are a number of things an Operating Agreement cannot do, including varying the rights and duties of the LLC, unreasonably restricting the right of access to books and records of the LLC, eliminating the duties of a Manager of the LLC, varying the requirements to wind up the LLC business in certain circumstances, and restricting the rights of third parties.

What does this mean for your LLC? Depending on how your LLC is structured, your Operating Agreement may need revision to comply with these new statutory changes. Additionally, LLC Members and Managers should understand and abide by their respective fiduciary duties. Companies are advised to consider these issues and seek counsel from their attorney to ensure continued compliance with Ohio law.

Do You Deserve a Break Today? Not at this McDonald’s

  by Merle F. Wilberding

In McDonald’s Corp v. Union County Board of Revision, 2012 Ohio 3751 (Court of Appeals – 3rd District), McDonald’s Corporation made it clear that Connolly Construction Co. (“Connolly”) did not deserve a break today. In fact, McDonald’s Corporation wanted Connolly thrown out of court.

On March 31, 2011, Connolly filed a Complaint with the Union County Board of Revision challenging the valuation of McDonald’s property in Marysville. McDonald’s Corporation intervened in the proceeding and moved to dismiss Connolly’s Complaint because the Complaint was signed by “John R. Connolly,” with no indication of his status.  It was acknowledged that he was a salaried employee of Connolly, but there was no evidence as to whether or not he was an officer of Connolly.

On August 20, 2012, the Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the case for want of jurisdiction, ruling that, as a salaried employee of Connolly, John R. Connolly, did not come within the protection of the Ohio Supreme Court’s ruling in Dayton Supply & Tool Company v. Montgomery County Board of Revision, 111 Ohio St.3d 367, 2006-Ohio-5852, 856 N.E.2d 926 (2006).

In Dayton Supply, the Supreme Court had ruled that a corporate officer had not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by signing a complaint for the valuation of property before the Montgomery County Board of Revision. In McDonald’s, the Court of Appeals ruled that a salaried employee did engage in the unauthorized practice of law by signing a complaint for the valuation of property before the Union County Board of Revision.

In making that ruling, I believe the Court of Appeals identified a distinction in employee labels without a difference in whether that act constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.  I had the opportunity to argue Dayton Supply before the Ohio Supreme Court and I am confident that neither the oral argument nor the written decision supports a conclusion that a salaried corporate employee engages in the unauthorized practice of law by signing a Complaint, but a salaried corporate officer does not engage in the unauthorized practice of law by signing the exact same type of complaint.

The real thrust of the Dayton Supply decision was that a non-attorney employed by a corporation could sign a complaint before a board of revision without engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, as long as that employee does not actively participate in the case by making legal arguments, examining witnesses, or undertaking any other tasks that can be performed only by an attorney.

If that holding were applied properly in Connolly, the case could have proceeded on the merits.  Instead, the public interest factors advanced by the Supreme Court went unheeded by the Court of Appeals in its ruling that I believe unfairly restricts the public’s access to the judicial system without any corresponding benefit to the public.  I hope the Ohio Supreme Court reviews the Connolly case.

Protecting Against Unfair Competition: Will Your Company’s Non-Compete Agreements Survive a Merger?

Marc Fleischauer by Marc Fleischauer

The Ohio Supreme Court recently decided a case about non-competition agreements and the surprising effect of corporate mergers on their enforceability.  The decision changes Ohio law significantly and gives rise to urgent and specific drafting recommendations for employers.

In Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C. v. Fishel, 2012-Ohio-2297 (2012), the Court was faced with a common scenario.  “Company A” had required certain employees to sign restrictive covenants (commonly called “non-compete agreements”) prohibiting solicitation of customers and other competition against Company A for two years following termination of employment.  Company A later merged with “Company B” to form “Company AB.”  The same employees continued working for Company AB for several years after the merger, doing the same jobs with no apparent interruption.

Roughly four years after the merger, the employees quit their jobs at Company AB and joined a competing business.  According to the Court, “They soon used their contacts to recruit multiple customer accounts from [Company AB].  Within six months, 19 customers had transferred $1 million in revenue….”

Company AB sued to enforce the employees’ agreements with Company A, based on the merger and the operation of Ohio Revised Statute § 1701.82.  That statute says that a newly merged company is “vested” in the contractual rights of the original companies “without further act or deed.”  Company AB maintained that it had automatically taken on all the same contract rights originally belonging to Company A.

The Supreme Court decided that indeed Company AB could enforce the agreements as written, but it added a huge caveat that dramatically altered the effect of mergers in Ohio going forward.  The employees had only agreed not to compete with Company A; the agreements did not expressly include similar restrictions against competing with Company A’s “successors and assigns,” which would have included Company AB.  So while Company AB could technically prevent competition with the now-defunct Company A, it was powerless to prevent competition against Company AB, according to the Court.

Further, the Court held that the same merger that had transformed Company A into Company AB was itself was a “termination of employment” event, starting the clock on the employees’ two-year non-competition requirement.  By the time the employees quit Company AB and started competing, any contractual obligations they had owed to Company A had already long expired.

In the current economic climate, corporate mergers and other acquisitions are commonplace as companies seek to consolidate or otherwise change their corporate status.  Often these corporate changes have little or no practical effect on employees, who at most might see a new name on their paychecks.  But with this new Supreme Court decision, employers may be inadvertently giving away their restrictive covenant rights.  To avoid an Acordia outcome, employers should take these steps now:

  • Ensure that non-compete contracts define “company” to include “successors and assigns,” such that employees will remain contractually obligated regardless of what corporate form the employer takes in the future.
  • Draft such agreements to make clear that mere mergers or other legal changes in corporate form do not trigger the post-termination commencement of the non-compete period.
  • If you suspect that the company’s existing agreements are already susceptible to the new Acordia outcome, especially if your company has ever undergone a change in corporate structure, consider amending or rewriting existing agreements with the help of experienced employment counsel.

Reach out and touch someone… at your own risk! Police can track cell phone emitted GPS data without a warrant

Sasha VanDeGrift by Sasha VanDeGrift

For those of you who have followed the Coolidge How the TECH Are You? portion of the blog, you may remember that we blogged earlier this year about an Ohio Appellate Court that held that there is no right to privacy in the data that cell phone providers keep on their customers.

Now, the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has weighed in on cell phone data, holding that police can track the GPS signal a cell phone emits without a warrant. See United States v. Skinner, No. 09-6497 (6th Cir. Aug. 14, 2012).

In the opening line of the Opinion, Judge Rogers opines that “[w]hen criminals use modern technological devices to carry out criminal acts and to reduce the possibility of detection, they can hardly complain when the police take advantage of the inherent characteristics of those very devices to catch them.” The full Opinion is available at the link below.

For the average person, the idea of the police being able to track you using the GPS information your cell phone spits into the air waves might evoke memories of reading the novel 1984 in high school English class or watching a crime drama rerun from last week. But for those involved in illegal enterprises, the Sixth Circuit’s ruling, like emerging technologies, “changes everything. Again.”

http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/12a0262p-06.pdf